China Labor Watch Annual Report 2013 by China Labor Watch
 
  
 
China Labor Watch 2013 Annual Report  1 
-- 
 
 
2013 Annual eport 2013 Annual Report 
  
 
 
   
 
    
China Labor Watch 2013 Annual Report 
 
                                      Contents 
 
2013 CLW in Review  
 1 
  
The State of Chinese Labor in 2013  
 7 
  
Worker Hotline  
 12 
  
Factory Investigations and Investigative Reports  
 16 
  
”Women’s Leadership Training” for Female Labor 
Rights Activists 
 
 20 
  
Acknowledgements   
 21 
  
Financials  
 22 
  
How You Can Help  
 23 
 
  
 
 
   
 
    
China Labor Watch 2013 Annual Report 
                              2013 CLW in Review 
January 
CLW Executive Director, Li Qiang, went to China to conduct research on labor 
conditions. 
CLW communicated with Apple about child labor issues found in a Foxconn facility. 
Based on CLW’s research and follow-up, Apple and Foxconn sent the child workers back 
to school, promising to cover their tuition and living expenses until they were 16 years 
old.  
Workers of Xin Hai Yang Precision (Jiangxi) Ltd. factory, a subsidiary of Foxconn, 
went on a strike to demand a raise. According to the information obtained by CLW, 
although workers were required to labor long hours at a fast pace to meet high quotas, 
they only earned between 1,300 RMB ($209) and 2,600 RMB ($418) per month. CLW 
hopes that through talks with Foxconn, a more effective communication channel 
between workers and management could be built, especially via the establishment and 
promotion of democratic union elections that make the union more effectively serve 
workers’ interests.  
February 
Based on a series of investigative reports that China Labor Watch released, three 
French NGOs filed a complaint with a Parisian prosecutor's office against Samsung's 
subsidiary in France, alleging that the affiliate should be held responsible for labor 
violations in China. CLW’s Executive Director, Li Qiang, attended a press conference held 
in France, claiming that Samsung ignored all documents which evidenced child labor 
issues found in Samsung’s supplier factories in China. In December 2012, two weeks 
after Samsung denied CLW’s accusation that Samsung’s supplier factory hired child 
workers in China, CLW discovered child workers again at another facility supplying to 
Samsung.  
March 
CLW Executive Director, Li Qiang, attended the Electronic Industry Citizenship 
Coalition (EICC) conference held in Taiwan. There he expressed his ideas about workers’ 
rights protection in electronics factories, especially the prohibition of child workers.  
Li Qiang gave a talk at Columbia University Law School about Chinese labor 
conditions.  
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April 
CLW completed investigations on working conditions 
at the Foxconn factory in Zhengzhou and Catcher factory 
in Suqian. After CLW communicated with Apple, it 
developed some improvement measures. For example, 
one violation at Catcher was that workers could not resign 
if any management personnel refused to sign the 
resignation document. To solve this problem, Apple required the factory to establish a 
special resignation application channel for those cases in which a worker faced 
difficulties in completing the regular resignation process. In addition, Apple also asked 
the factory to develop its electronic HR system to enhance resignation management and 
conduct internal monitoring of the enforcement of policies on a regular basis.  
May 
CLW released news about a 14-year-old child worker, Liu 
Fuzong, who died at Jinchuan Electronics, a supplier factory 
that produced for ASUS. This tragedy revealed that the factory 
illegally hired child workers. Based on the information obtained 
by CLW, this factory had a lot of student workers who were 
required to work 12 hours a day regardless of their ages. 
 The dead 14-year-old boy 
Based on information provided to CLW by workers at the Foxconn factory in 
Zhengzhou, CLW released news about three workers of that factory that over the span 
of 20 days jumped off buildings to their deaths. Families of deceased workers protested 
in front of the factory gate against the factory’s indifference.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
The parents of the first deceased worker tied a banner near the Foxconn gate that reads:  
" Foxconn doesn't care when its employees jump off of buildings. Heaven won't forgive this!!!" 
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June   
CLW Program Coordinator Kevin Slaten was interviewed by Voice of Russia, CNBC, 
and other media outlets regarding an American manager who was kidnapped by 
workers at his factory in China due to wage delays and the fear of being fired without 
compensation. Mr. Slaten used this opportunity to talk more broadly about worker 
treatment in today’s China. 
July 
At the end of July, CLW released an investigative report, disclosing serious labor 
violations of three factories belonging to the Pegatron Group, all of which were 
suppliers to Apple. Based on CLW’s findings, the factories violated a great number of 
international and Chinese laws as well as the standards of Apple’s own social 
responsibility code of conduct. 
August 
According to information obtained by CLW, Jiangxi Lianchuang Electronics Co., Ltd. 
illegally hired a great number of underage workers who were required to do fast-paced 
work for more than 10 hours a day. 
CLW attempted to send $5,000 via Western Union to China for investigator fees. 
When the investigator went to receive the wired money in China, the bank told him that 
the funds had been frozen. Western Union said that it required the contracts that CLW 
had signed with its investigators in order to unfreeze the money, but CLW did not want 
to reveal this information in order to maintain the confidentiality of the investigator 
identity. After thousands of supporters signed onto a CREDO petition to protest against 
Western Union’s behavior, it agreed that CLW could wire funds freely. 
September 
CLW released an investigative report on the Jabil Green Point factory in Wuxi, 
revealing a series of ethical and legal labor violations, including more than 11 hours of 
standing work every day, mandatory pre-employment pregnancy tests, and five-minute 
meal times, hiring discrimination, and unpaid overtime wages.  
October 
In October, CLW published an investigative report on six Chinese factories producing 
toys for Mattel, uncovering a great number of legal and ethical violations, including 
unfairly and incorrectly calculating workers’ working hours and wages, amounting to 
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millions of dollars of unpaid wages every year. These infringements provided further 
evidence that Mattel has failed to rigorously enforce its own code of conduct for 
supplier factories since 1997. After the report was released, CLW petition to protest 
Mattel’s labor violations on CREDO received more than 16,000 signatures.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CLW also released news about hundreds of workers from the Shenzhen Hengtong 
Rubber Factory who went on strike to protest the factory’s infringement on their rights. 
The factory installed surveillance cameras inside the workshops to monitor workers and 
reduced overtime hours in order to force veteran workers to resign.  
In October, CLW also obtained information on the sudden deaths of several workers 
at the Pegatron (Shanghai) Ltd Co., a factory primarily producing cell phones and tablet 
PCs for Apple. The deceased were all young workers, including Shi Zhaokun, a 15-year-
old child worker who died after working at the factory for only one month.  After Shi 
Zhaokun’s family contacted CLW for assistance, CLW immediately communicated with 
Pegatron and Apple to learn about details of the case. CLW also sought donations from 
the public to pay for an independent autopsy. Based on information gained in CLW’s 
investigation, there was a harmful curing agent used at the factory that could seriously 
affect people’s health. Through CLW’s repeated consultations and communications with 
Pegatron, the factory promised to give Shi’s family compensation of 150,000 RMB 
($24,820).  
November     
CLW organized “Leadership Training of Female Labor Rights Activists” in Shenzhen, 
Guangdong. During the training session, a diverse group of 25 promising female leaders 
in the Chinese labor movement participated in the workshop, and were educated about 
legal knowledge, NGO management, and promotions. In addition, female activists 
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shared their own experiences in rights advocacy with each other, creating linkages 
between the female activists going forward. 
CLW’s Executive Director, Li Qiang, gave a talk on Chinese labor conditions at the 
Goethe-Institut New York. 
 
December 
CLW published an investigative report on labor conditions at Samkwang Science and 
Technology, a Samsung cell phone supplier in Dongguan, Guangdong. The report 
uncovered a series of labor violations, including hiring discrimination, overtime working 
hours seriously exceeding maximum legal standards, abusive language used by 
management against workers, and insufficient protection of student workers.  
CLW cooperated with Peuples Solidaires, a French NGO, to carry out a “Worker 
Barbie” protest campaign in Paris, France. The life-sized worker Barbie doll was unveiled 
in a towering hot pink box, taped with black duct tape and tied with chains, suggesting 
the lack of rights that Mattel workers have over their working and living conditions. CLW 
Program Coordinator Kevin Slaten joined in the street protest and talked to French 
media about the widespread labor violations in Mattel supplier factories.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Worker Barbie” in Paris 
CLW released news about dozens of underage female workers from 
Liangshan Yi Autonomous Prefecture who were found working in Click Technology 
Limited, a Shenzhen-based factory. These young workers labored at a high rate of work 
and didn’t even receive some overtime pay from the factory. In addition, among these 
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female workers, there were several child workers (under 16). After this child labor issue 
was revealed, related labor departments carried out systematic inspection in local 
factories and imposed punishment on those carrying out introduction, dispatch, or 
hiring of child labor.   
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                                  The State of Chinese Labor in 2013 
China has continued to develop economically since the 1980s, but the rights of 
Chinese workers during this time have been limited. While the right of freedom of 
association and collective bargaining is missing from the Chinese legal framework, many 
legally enshrined individual labor rights are frequently violated. The rampant abuse of 
labor rights have led to skyrocketing labor conflicts. For example, the number of labor 
dispute cases accepted by China’s labor dispute arbitration committees (LDACs) and the 
number of employees involved in these disputes increased dramatically from 12,358 
and 34,794 in 1993 to 589,244 and 779,490 in 2011, respectively.1  
To maintain industrial peace and political stability, the Chinese government has 
enacted or revised a number of labor laws to re-regulate employment conditions, such 
as Labor Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law and Social Insurance Law. In particular, 
the implementation of the much debated Labor Contract Law in 2008 has improved 
certain working conditions.2 Moreover, to stimulate domestic consumption and reduce 
the widening income gap, the Chinese government has started to reform the wage and 
income distribution system, as evidenced by policy initiatives like the 2004 Minimum 
Wage Regulation and 2013 “Opinions on Deepening the Reform of Income Distribution 
System.” According to official data, in 2012 alone, 25 provinces increased their 
minimum wages by an average of 20 percent. 
Nonetheless, despite the introduction of stricter labor laws and strengthened 
enforcement, labor rights violations are still common in today’s China. A large scale 
survey of migrant workers in the Pearl River Delta area in 2010 revealed that 5% and 14% 
of the respondents had experienced wage arrears, wage deductions, or fines; average 
weekly working hours were 57; the coverage of legally mandatory insurances ranged 
from 14% to 54%; only 65% had labor contracts; only 36% had participated in contract 
negotiation; 11% had paid illegal employment deposits and 6% had had their ID cards 
seized by employers; 22% worked in unsafe environments; 7% had been forced to work; 
and 3% had experienced abuse like body searches, managerial assault, or even illegal 
detention.3 Moreover, wages of Chinese workers are still notoriously low. Due to weak 
law enforcement and various countermeasures of employers, such as using minimum 
                                                          
1 Ministry of Labor and Social Security. 2012. China Labor Statistics Yearbook 2012. Beijing: China Statistics Press.   
2 Lee, Chang-Hee and Mingwei Liu. 2011. Measuring the Effects of the Collective Voice Mechanism and the Labor 
Contract Law: A Survey of Labor Relations and Human Resources Management in China. Geneva: ILO; Ho, Virginia. 
2009. “From Contracts to Compliance? An Early Look at Implementation Under China’s New Labor Legislation.” 
Columbia Journal of Asian Law, 23 (1): 35-107. 
3 Liu, Linping, Xin Yong, and Binbin Shu. 2011. ‘Regional Differences in Labor Rights: A Survey of Rural Migrant 
Workers in the Pearl River Delta and the Yangtze River Delta,’ Social Sciences in China, 2011 (2), 107-23. 
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wages as prevailing wages, increasing fees charge to workers for accommodation and 
meals, and forcing workers to engage in unpaid overtime, the overall effect of the new 
government wage policies has been greatly inhibited.4 Additionally, prices in China have 
continued to rise rapidly. Recent wage increases, though significant, can barely keep 
pace with sharply rising inflation, especially in basic consumption such as food, clothes, 
and housing. 5  Therefore, recent efforts by the Chinese government to regulate 
employment conditions have fallen far short of their goal.  
The ineffectiveness of labor rights monitoring and enforcement in China can be 
traced back in part to two major barriers: labor rights protection institutions’ lack of 
accurate information on factory conditions and workers’ lack of effective access to 
rights defense channels.  
First, workplace dispute resolution institutions such as enterprise labor dispute 
mediation committees, suggestion/grievance boxes, and employee committees are 
missing in most Chinese enterprises. Where these institutions do exist, they are usually 
under heavy influence or control of employers and therefore do not effectively resolve 
labor disputes.6  
Second, despite official dispute resolution institutions playing a role in resolving 
some worker grievances, these institutions often contain stumbling blocks for workers 
and tend to favor economic development over labor rights. Labor dispute mediation has 
some advantages, such as easy and free access, lack of heavy employer influence, 
flexible procedures, and quick settlements. Yet common problems significantly limit the 
effectiveness of mediation, including the low capacity and weak authority of mediation 
agencies, mediators’ lack of motivation and skills, and agencies’ priority of economic 
growth over workers’ rights.7 While arbitration and litigation mechanisms have more 
authority, it is often difficult for workers, especially migrant workers, to obtain access to 
these institutions; the cost of going through these lengthy processes is prohibitively high 
                                                          
4 China Labor Watch. 2013. Mattel's Unceasing Abuse of Chinese Workers: An investigation of six Mattel supplier 
factories. 
5 China Labor Bulletin. 2011. Unity is Strength: The Workers Movement in China, 2009-2011; Liu, Mingwei. 2013. 
“China.” In Frege, Carala and John Kelly (eds) Comparative Employment Relations in the Global Political Economy, 
London: Routledge, pp.324-347. 
6 Liu Mingwei. 2014. “Conflict Resolution in China.” In William K. Roche, Paul Teague, Alex Colvin (eds) Oxford 
Handbook of Conflict Management in Organizations. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press (forthcoming). 
7 Halegua, A. 2008. ‘Getting Paid: Processing the Labor Disputes of China’s Migrant Workers’. Berkeley Journal of 
International Law, 26 (1), 254-322; Li, X. and Shen, X. 2011. ‘Legalization Grand Mediation and the Establishment of 
the Labor and Personnel Dispute Mediation System’. Jianghai Zongheng, 9, 48-52; Sheng, J. and Jin, L. 2009. 
‘Establishing United Guidelines and Jointly Pushing Forward Grassroots Mediation’. Labor Security World, 12, 38-41; 
Taylor, B. and Li, Q. 2012. ‘Conflict Resolution in China: The Wrongs of Mediating Rights’. Paper presented at the 
International Labor and Employment Relations Associations Congress, Philadelphia, PA. 
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for many workers; and these institutions are heavily influenced by government.8 Labor 
inspection agencies, a third institution, may sometimes resolve labor disputes quickly 
given their authority to order employers to correct problems and pay fines. However, 
these agencies tend to suffer from many of the shortcomings bedeviling the labor 
dispute resolution system, most notably a lack of motivation and capacity as well as a 
tendency to favor the interests of employers. Finally, it is true that the traditional 
administrative procedures such as petitioning Party organs and the government’s 
Letters and Visits Offices are free and considered simpler than formal labor dispute 
resolution mechanisms, but these mechanisms are far from costless as the result may 
not only be a lack of settlement but even the detention or beating of petitioning 
workers.9 
Third, the influence of China’s official labor union, the All-China Federation of Trade 
Unions (ACFTU), is restricted, and the unions rarely participate in rights defense actions. 
While a regional ACFTU may occasionally provide limited legal aid to a very small 
number of workers in labor disputes, the subordination of enterprise level unions to 
management makes them largely useless to workers.10 The ACFTU has some ongoing 
reforms, such as direct elections of grassroots union chairs and collective consultation, 
but these reforms are largely top-down, formalistic campaigns. Genuine direct union 
elections are still extremely rare, and collective bargaining seldom results in substantial 
gains for workers.11  
Fourth, labor rights NGOs in China can claim some successes in the past ten years, 
such as promoting the observance of labor laws, educating many workers on rights 
defense, participating in joint actions with workers, and drawing greater attention in the 
business world to Chinese labor rights.12 However, most labor NGOs tend to be 
                                                          
8 Chen, F. and Xu, X. 2012. ‘“Active Judiciary”: Judicial Dismantling of Workers’ Collective Action in China’. The 
China Journal, 62 (1), 87-107; Chen, Y. 2010. China’s Labor Dispute Settlement: Forced Settlement, Worker 
Awareness of Rights, and Policy Suggestions. Dissertation, Arizona State University; Halegua, A. 2008. ‘Getting Paid’; 
Taylor, B. and Li, Q. 2012. ‘Conflict Resolution in China’. 
9 Halegua, A. 2008. ‘Getting Paid’; Taylor, B., Chang, K. and Li, Q. 2003. Industrial Relations in China. Cheltenham 
and Northampton: Edward Elgar. 
10 Liu, Mingwei. 2010. ‘Union Organizing in China: Still a Monolithic Labor Movement?’ Industrial and Labor 
Relations Review, 64 (1), 30-52; Liu, Mingwei, Chunyun Li and Sunghoon Kim. 2011. ‘Chinese Trade Unions in 
Transition: A Three Level Analysis.’ In Peter Shelton, Sunghoon Kim, Yiqiong Li, and Malcolm Warner (eds) China’s 
Changing Workplace, London and New York: Routledge, 277-300. 
11 Pringle, Tim. 2011. Trade Unions in China: The Challenge of Labor Unrest. Oxon and New York: Routledge; Chan, 
C. K. C. and Hui, E.S.I. (forthcoming) ‘The Development of Collective Bargaining in China: From ‘Collective 
Bargaining by Riot’ to ‘Party State-led Wage Bargaining.’ The China Quarterly. 
12 Chan, Chris King-Chi. 2012. ‘Community-Based Organizations for Migrant Workers’ Rights: The Emergence of 
Labor NGOs in China,’ Community Development Journal, Advance Access March 14, 2012, 1-17; Lee, Ching Kwan 
and Yuan Shen. 2011. ‘The Anti-Solidarity Machine? Labor Nongovernmental Organizations in China.’ In Kuruvilla 
Sarosh, Ching Kwan Lee and Mary Gallagher (eds) From Iron Rice Bowl to Informalization: Markets, Workers, and 
the State in a Changing China, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 173-87. 
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clustered in coastal regions or big cities; moreover, their rights defense activities are 
constrained by government suppression and a lack of resources.13  
Fifth, the efforts made by multinational companies (MNCs) to improve labor 
conditions in China, particularly through the use of codes of conduct and monitoring 
mechanisms aimed at enforcing compliance with these codes, have also fallen very 
short of their mark. As information is central to this model of global private regulation, 
factory audits that collect information on supplier compliance are critical for effective 
monitoring. However, the accuracy and transparency of social auditing by either MNCs 
or third party agencies are in serious doubt.14 A number of important conflicts of 
interest exist among the key actors involved in the auditing process.15 For instance, 
brands and their suppliers may have an interest in hiding labor violations rather than 
reporting them. Third party auditors may tend to please their clients (the brands and 
their suppliers) who pay for the services. Additionally, the auditing process is full of 
deficiencies.16 Audits are usually conducted once or twice annually through one or two-
day visits, focusing primarily on management-provided systems and documents, and the 
factories often receive notice of the audits ahead of time. The frequency, process, and 
method of these audits equate them to a snapshot of labor conditions influenced by 
factories covering up labor violations. The persistence of rights abuses in brand name 
suppliers, even after the audits were conducted, is evidence of the failure of this 
auditing system. For example, practically every one of the 400 factories in which China 
Labor Watch (CLW) has exposed serious labor rights violations over the past decade has 
been audited at least once by MNCs or a third party auditing firm. In just 2013, CLW 
investigated 20 factories that produce for Apple, Mattel, Dell, Samsung, and other 
brands, uncovering a great number of serious violations, such as child labor, unpaid 
wages, illegal overtime, poor safety, and discrimination.17 Some supplier factories have 
set up third-party worker hotlines under pressure from MNCs, but the efficacy of these 
hotlines vary widely depending on the willingness of brands to respond to the 
grievances of workers.  
                                                          
13 Chan, Chris King-Chi. 2012. “Community-Based Organizations for Migrant Workers’ Rights”. 
14 Locke, Richard and Romis, Monica. 2010. 'The promise and perils of private voluntary regulation: Labor standards 
and work organization in two Mexican garment factories', Review of International Political Economy, 17:1: 45-74. 
15 Esbenshade, Jill. 2004. Monitoring Sweatshops: Workers,Consumers, and the Global Apparel Industry. Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press; Rodriguez-Garavito, Cesar A. 2005. “Global Governance and Labor Rights: Codes of Conduct 
and Anti-Sweatshop Struggles in Global Apparel Factories in Mexico and Guatemala.” Politics and Society, 33 (2): 203–
33. 
16 Stephanie Clifford and Steven Greenhouse. “Fast and Flawed Inspections of Factories Abroad”. New York Times, 
September 1, 2013. 
17 For a number of these reports, please see CLW’s report page: http://chinalaborwatch.org/2013.html  
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Finally, the lack of effective rights defense channels has forced an increasing number 
of workers to engage in spontaneous strikes or protests followed by collective 
bargaining with employers. These actions, sometimes encouraged and supported by 
labor NGOs, have the potential to win substantial gains for workers.18 However, the 
strikes are usually ephemeral in nature, and the strikers and labor NGOs involved face a 
high risk of government suppression. This risk has even increased in 2013 when the 
Chinese government mounted a renewed crackdown on civil society and activists.19     
A fundamental improvement in Chinese workers’ rights will require the construction 
of laws allowing democratic labor unions and collective bargaining as well as the 
realization of the right to strike. But these prerequisites are inevitably linked to political 
reform and the development of civil society in China that, under the one-party regime, 
are long-term goals. Until then, the greatest amount of change can be achieved by 
amplifying worker voice, strengthening labor rights monitoring and enforcement 
mechanisms, and utilizing pressure generated from domestic and international public 
opinion to improve workers’ conditions as well as remedy and prevent rights violations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
18 Elfstrom, Manfred and Sarosh Kuruvilla. 2012. ‘The Changing Nature of Labor Unrest in China.’ Paper presented at 
the International Labor and Employment Relations Associations Congress, Philadelphia, PA. 
19 There are numerous news reports on China’s mounted crackdown on activists and civil society; see for example, 
Andrew Jacobs and Chris Buckley. “Chinese Activists Test New Leader and Are Crushed”. New York Times, January 
15, 2014.  
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                                     China Labor Watch Programs 
Worker Hotline 
Since June 2010, CLW has supported a worker hotline in China. The hotline has 
successfully encouraged workers to protect their legal rights through a communication 
channel offering advice on rights protection to workers and, in the event that workers 
express grievances, acts as a bridge between workers and factories. As of December 31, 
2013, the hotline has received and handled nearly 5,000 cases.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The hotline promotion in factory 
After three years of development, the worker hotline is garnering increased 
attention and popularity among workers. In 2013, the hotline handled 1,894 cases, a 44% 
increase over 2012 and a 63% increase over 2011. Details regarding number of cases per 
month and the nature of cases throughout the year are reflected in the following charts:   
Number of cases per month from 2011 to 2013 
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2013 96 94 177 201 188 203 181 203 146 169 124 112 1894 
2012 43 100 112 105 85 76 95 102 98 163 160 175 1314 
2011 51 26 48 76 96 88 87 103 116 139 179 154 1163 
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             Case Content Analysis for 2013 
 
Hotline staff confirmed that 769 of the 1,894 cases the worker hotline handled in 
2013 were related to supplier factories for brand companies with which the hotline 
cooperates. By promoting the worker hotline in more factories, the hotline has 
developed cooperative relationships with some brands and factories and has effectively 
established a three-way bridge among brand companies, supplier factories, and workers. 
The worker hotline allows workers to voice their grievances and report rights violations 
occurring in the factories. It helps workers put an end to these violations by giving them 
a starting place to share their stories, educating them about their rights, and facilitating 
communication among workers, factory management, and the brand companies they 
supply.    
 
Mediating Conflict between Factories and Workers 
An employee from a cooperating factory contacted the hotline, complaining that 
when he resigned, his employer withheld his last month’s wages. Because the worker 
was initially afraid to approach factory management directly, the hotline communicated 
the issue to the factory. The factory asked that the former employee to identify himself 
to the human resources department and verify his employment history with the factory. 
Again, the worker was concerned about repercussions that might result from revealing 
his identity to factory management. Because of the hotline’s continued communications 
Case Content Analysis for 2013 
Labor Contracts
Wages
Working Hours and Leave
Work Injury
Occupational Safety
Social Insurance
Monetary Compensation
Resignation
Other
9%
2%
9% 
16% 
7%
% 
 9% 
 9% 
23% 
12% 
9% 
13% 
 
 
 
China Labor Watch 2013 Annual Report 
 14 
with both the employee and the factory, the employee ultimately felt comfortable 
approaching the human resources department in person. Having already been made 
aware of its mistake, the factory paid the withheld wages and the worker left satisfied.  
In August, an employee from another cooperating factory complained that because 
he took four days of annual leave, deductions were made from his base wages as well as 
the additional amount he earned by virtue of his seniority at the factory. After the 
hotline communicated this situation to the factory, the factory verified that it had made 
a mistake in transmitting information about the worker when he changed shifts, and 
paid him the remainder of wages he was owed. The worker was very satisfied with this 
result. 
Resolving Workers’ Questions      
Numerous workers contact the hotline to express concern and confusion over work-
related issues. In these situations, the hotline communicates with the workers’ factories 
to help alleviate the confusion. In April, an employee inquired over the worker hotline 
about possible compensation, saying that the factory he had worked for terminated his 
contract. Hotline staff contacted representatives from the factory, who explained that, 
according to their understanding, both parties had terminated the contract under terms 
of mutual agreement. The employee did not challenge this. In August, another employee 
called the worker hotline, saying that he did not know whether his wages were 
calculated based on hours worked or units produced. The hotline contacted the factory, 
learned that wages were based on hours worked, and explained this to the employee, 
resolving his question. 
Promoting Factory Reform 
The worker hotline program also plays an increasingly important role in encouraging 
broader factory reform. In July, for instance, a worker complained that in order to meet 
its production demands, his factory forced him to work overtime. After hotline staff 
reflected this to the factory, the factory said that it would require that managers change 
their management methods to end the practice of forced overtime. Another worker 
complained that a line leader would curse at workers. After hotline staff notified the 
factory, the factory replied that it would hold trainings related to this issue for all line 
leaders and department heads. In follow-up conversations with hotline staff, the worker 
expressed that the situation had improved. 
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Investigating Workplace Injuries 
In January, March, and April of 2013, CLW visited a total of 
24 injured workers in two hospitals in Shenzhen. 22 of them 
were male and two female. They came from nine different 
provinces in China, and their ages ranged from 18 to 54.  CLW 
staff obtained information from them about the purchase of 
workplace injury insurance in their workplace, the 
classification of their injuries for the purposes of China’s 
worker’s compensation system, the payment of medical 
expenses, and other issues. 
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Factory Investigations and Investigative Reports 
2013 witnessed the continuation of CLW’s unceasing efforts to reveal the labor 
conditions of China’s workers and hold management and buyers to account. CLW 
investigators carried out undercover investigations in 18 electronics and toy factories 
across Shanghai, Jiangsu, Guangdong and other Chinese provinces and municipalities. 
Through rigorous investigation and in-depth interviews with hundreds of workers, CLW 
completed a series of reports, exposing numerous legal and ethical labor violations. 
Factories that make products for Apple, Samsung, Mattel and other multinational 
brand-name companies, driven by supply chain profits, blatantly abuse workers’ rights. 
The factories that CLW investigated employ a combined total of about 130,000 workers. 
Considering that these factories constitute only a small, representative fraction of all 
those operating in China, it is difficult to imagine the number of workers whose rights 
are being violated, every day, inside factories across China. 
Throughout 2013, CLW continued to pay close attention to 
the labor conditions in Apple’s supplier factories. Through 
undercover investigations in Shanghai into three factories 
belonging to the Pegatron Group, a major Apple supplier, we 
found labor abuses even more severe than those reported in 
Foxconn factories. Among the 86 labor rights violations revealed 
in CLW’s reports, which include excess overtime and extremely 
low wages, the most egregious was the hiring of underage 
student workers. CLW’s July report pointed out that a number of underage student 
workers were introduced to factory work through third 
party hiring agencies. In many cases, the third party go-
between was the student’s own school.  Factories saw the 
students as a cheap source of labor and employed them 
to do work completely unrelated to their areas of study. 
For instance, a student worker from Chongxin Vocational 
Training Center in Gansu Province, majoring in pre-school 
education, was assigned to the production line. He was 
required to pay set “fees” to his school and to the teacher 
in charge of his production team, but didn’t always 
receive his own wages on time. After CLW published its 
investigative report on the Pegatron Group, Apple indicated that it would examine and 
improve working conditions in these factories. In response to the report’s 
documentation of wages withheld by the factories, Apple demanded that Pegatron give 
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to 257 student workers the back pay they were owed, and assisted 20 dispatch workers 
in recovering wages from dispatch labor companies. 
In October 2013, CLW learned 
that several workers died at 
Pegatron (Shanghai) Ltd Co. Among 
them, the death of 15-year-old Shi 
Zhaokun once again sparked 
outrage, within China Labor Watch 
and among the broader society, at 
Apple supplier factories’ practice of 
employing child laborers. The 
results of Shi’s pre-employment 
physical examination on September 
4 indicated that he was in good 
health, but after barely a month of 
working in the factory, on October 9, he died suddenly. Shi’s family approached CLW in 
search of help; CLW promptly contacted Pegatron and Apple, as well as collecting 
donations from the public to pay for an independent autopsy to determine the cause of 
Shi’s death.  According to CLW’s understanding, toxic gas in the production workshop of 
this particular factory, where workers put in long hours every day, put their health at 
great risk.  After repeated consultations between CLW and Pegatron, the factory 
promised to compensate Shi Zhaokun’s family in the amount of 150,000 RMB (USD 
$24,820).  
The difference between conditions faced by workers in Apple’s supplier factories 
and the labor standards that the Apple Corporation has promised and promoted are 
vast. As long as Apple does not go further in fulfilling the promises it has made to 
workers, its supplier factories will continue to force employees to work overtime and to 
abuse laborers they can procure cheaply, in order to preserve the cost advantage of 
their products. Aside from the egregious problem of employing students and child 
laborers, investigations launched by China Labor Watch in April 2013 into the 
Zhengzhou Foxconn factory in Henan Province and the Catcher factory in Jiangsu 
Province, along with an investigative report published in September on the Jabil Green 
Point Factory in Wuxi, Jiangsu Province, provided additional evidence of a countless 
succession of labor violations taking place in factories within Apple’s supply chain.  In 
Wuxi’s Jabil Green Point Factory, workers are required to work while standing for more 
than 11 hours per day and forced to sign agreements stating that their overtime work is 
completely voluntary.   
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Like the workers at Pegatron, Jabil Green Point workers are paid less than 
subsistence living wage, and the only way they can earn enough to live is by taking 
tremendous amounts of overtime.  This is the basic model through which factories like 
Pegatron, Jabil Green Point, Foxconn, and others exploit cheap labor and compel 
employee overtime. These factories also sometimes go so far as to withhold workers’ 
overtime pay.  Based on recent estimates, Jabil Green Point could owe its approximately 
30,000 workers for overtime back pay in the total amount of 51 million RMB (USD $8.3 
million). The illegal and unethical treatment of workers at Jabil Green Point revealed in 
CLW’s report have drawn widespread attention, and the United States Department of 
Labor and Department of Homeland Security have since launched their own 
investigations into this matter. 
Building upon its November 2012 
investigative report into eight supplier 
factories for Mattel, the world’s largest 
toy manufacturer, CLW published a 
report in October 2013, documenting 
labor abuses in another six Mattel 
supplier factories.  Given that Mattel has 
approximately 100 supplier factories in China, it suggests that 
the abuses CLW encountered are wide-ranging, and continue in 
Mattel supplier factories other than the 14 in which on-site 
investigations have been conducted.  The violations witnessed 
point to Mattel’s failure to enforce its own self-imposed code of conduct for supplier 
factories, which has been in place since 1997.  
In May 2013, CLW sent a follow-up letter to Mattel, asking it to respond to the 
allegations in the 2012 report, but as of the time of publication of the October 2013 
report, Mattel had not responded. Because the labor violations were so severe, more 
than 300 workers from Mattel supplier Baode Toy Factory went on strike in August to 
demand social security benefits, as required by Chinese law, but the problem remains 
unresolved. Following the release of the October 2013 report, CLW received more than 
16,000 signatures on the petition website CREDO in support of our protest against labor 
rights violations in Mattel’s supplier factories. 
After the petition came out, Mattel’s corporate headquarters replied to a journalist, 
claiming that for many years the company has cooperated with International Council of 
Toy Industries (ICTI) to commission regular, fixed date audits in order to ensure the 
implementation of its global manufacturing standards. But even when audits overturn 
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labor violations, Mattel has taken little meaningful corrective action, and over time, 
Mattel’s public reporting of these audits has become more and more limited.  
Mattel indicated that if supplier factories failed to comply with these standards, it 
would terminate the factories’ contracts rather than continue to cooperate with them. 
However, if Mattel simply abandons its contracts with factories that are withholding 
worker wages and refusing to purchase social security insurance, this could result in 
even greater harm to workers, who would not only remain uninsured and without any 
means to collect back pay, but in addition, face unemployment and the deprivation of 
all income. 
In 2013, CLW conducted a two-week investigation 
into Samkwang, a Dongguan, Guangdong-based 
Samsung supplier factory. Our subsequent report, 
published in December, revealed that Samkwang hires 
workers from labor dispatch 
companies. The workers in turn pay 
fees to the dispatch companies to 
secure employment. In addition to 
immediately rejecting pregnant 
women during the application process, 
the factory doesn’t purchase 
maternity insurance for its other 
workers. Samkwang requires that 
production work be done barefoot on 
the cold factory floor. Factory foremen 
humiliate and verbally abuse workers and  constantly pressure workers to ensure that 
they are constantly producing at every momen. 
In response to CLW’s allegations of various forms of worker abuse, Samsung said it 
would send a group of experts to investigate Samkwang and take corrective measures to 
improve working conditions in the factory. Samsung also said that in early 2013 it sent a 
third-party auditing company to inspect Samkwang’s labor conditions and, based on the 
results of the audit, demanded that the factory come up with a plan to reform and 
rectify its labor practices.   
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”Women’s Leadership Training” for Female Labor Rights Activists 
In November 2013, CLW 
organized a Leadership Training for 
female labor rights activists in 
Shenzhen, Guangdong.  The training 
was aimed at promoting women’s 
involvement in public interest causes 
as well as individual leadership, 
teambuilding, and management skills. 
A diverse group of 25 women 
participated in the workshop. 20 
were from the Pearl River Delta region, the traditional heart of Chinese 
manufacturing, while the other five participants came from other areas currently 
undergoing rapid industrial development. Training sessions utilized lectures, 
discussions, participatory activities, and experience-sharing by successful NGO 
leaders, focused on critical issues of law, civil society norms, gender equality, NGO 
management and governance, and communication with government officials. In 
addition, the female activists in attendance shared their own experiences in rights 
advocacy and NGO management with one other, creating a support network through 
which to share information and assist each other going forward. 
Based on questionnaires, participants felt that the training was highly effective 
in providing useful information regarding rights defense and NGO development. 
Participants also hoped for more of these workshops in the future, so that more 
rights defenders could benefit. 
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                                    2013 Financials 
 
 
The following CLW financial statement has been audited by a certified public 
accountant 
 
Revenues  
Direct public support $ 246,910 
Interest income                       
16 
Total Revenues  246,926 
  
Expenses  
Program Expenses – China 63,312 
Officer salary  68,001 
Office salary 33,333 
Payroll Tax & Benefits  21,707 
Travel & Entertainment 15,542 
Rent 22,865 
Telephone and internet 4,716 
Office supplies and expenses 7,450 
Professional fees 3,000 
Insurance 725 
Depreciation 872 
Bank service charge 260 
Total Expenses 241,783 
  
(Deficit) for the year 5,143 
Net assets at the beginning of the year 63,925 
Net assets at the end of the year $        69,068 
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                                        How You Can Help 
There are a number of ways to support CLW in promoting the fair and legal 
treatment of Chinese workers. 
 
Follow us on Facebook and Twitter  
 
 
 
We update our Facebook and Twitter regularly with Chinese labor news and information 
about our most recent activities. 
 
Join in our Urgent Appeal Campaigns 
When we find evidence of labor abuse or child labor in the Chinese factories of 
international brands, we will sometimes lead campaigns to pressure those brands into 
recognizing and rectifying those violations. You can help by signing our petitions or 
writing letters to CEOs and officials. 
 
Donate 
Your contribution to CLW is tax deductible under Section 501(c)(3). You can donate 
securely via Paypal, sending payments to clw@chinalaborwatch.org. You can also make 
a check payable to “China Labor Watch” and send it to: 
China Labor Watch 
147 W. 35 St, Ste 406 
New York, NY 10001 
If you would like a receipt, please fill out the form on the following page. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Contribution Form  
 
China Labor Watch is a not-for-profit organization. Your contribution allows us to 
continue to focus our work on labor conditions in China. Your contribution is tax 
deductible under Section 501(c )(3). We will send a receipt of your contribution if you 
complete the following information.  
 
Date __________________  
This gift is from a: __ Individual/family __ Business __NGO/NPO  
 
Donor Information (please print or type) 
Name   
Billing address   
City   
State   
ZIP Code   
Telephone (home)   
Telephone (business)   
Fax   
E-Mail   
 
Your Gift to China Labor Watch:  
__ $10__ $5,000 __ $2,500 __$1,000 __ $500 __ $250 __ $100  
__ $50 __ $25 Other $_______  
 
Gift will be matched by ________________________________ 
(Company/Family/Foundation). ____ form enclosed ____ form will be forwarded   
 
____ I (we) wish to have our gift remain anonymous. 
 
Signature 
  
 
Date 
  
 
 
Please make checks, corporate matches, or other gifts payable to:  
China Labor Watch, 147 W. 35th St., STE 406, New York, NY 10001 
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